Abstract. This paper addresses refinement and testing based on CSP models, when we distinguish input and output events. From a testing perspective, there is an asymmetry: the tester (or the environment) controls the inputs, and the system under test controls the outputs. The standard models and refinement relations of CSP are, therefore, not entirely suitable for testing. Here, we adapt the CSP stable-failures model to consider an alphabet of events partitioned into inputs and outputs, resulting in the notion of input-output failures refinement. We compare that with the ioco relation often used in testing: they are incomparable, but for input-enabled processes, ioco is strictly stronger. Finally, we adapt the CSP testing theory to take into account inputs and outputs, and show that some tests become unnecessary.
Introduction
As a process algebra, CSP [19] is a well established notation, with robust semantics and tools; it has been in use for more than twenty years. The availability of a powerful model checker has ensured the acceptance of CSP both in academia and industry. Ford and QinetiQ are examples of companies that have made successful use of CSP to model and verify concurrent systems. In the public domain, we have reports on applications in hardware and e-commerce [1, 9] . In addition, CSP is the basis for a number of combinations with a data modelling language to define notations that cope with state-rich reactive systems [7, 15, 21, 6, 17] .
Admittedly, model-based testing is not a traditional area of application for CSP. It remains the case, however, that when a CSP model is available, the possibility of using it for testing is attractive, especially in industry. In fact, a testing theory is available for CSP [4] , and more recently, the use of CSP as part of testing techniques has been explored by a variety of researchers [14, 20, 5] .
A difficulty, however, is the fact that CSP models do not distinguish between input and output events: they are all synchronisations. In testing, though, there is an asymmetry: the system under test (SUT) controls outputs, while the tester controls inputs. In this paper, we follow a suggestion in [18] to define a stablefailures model parameterised by sets I and O of input and output events. We call it the input-output failures model, and define input-output failures refinement.
The stable-failures model is a suitable starting point for our work because, as usual, in testing, we assume that both models and systems are divergence free. In models, divergence is regarded as a mistake. Also, when testing an SUT, a divergence cannot be distinguished from a deadlock, so they are identified.
In the software testing community, there has been much interest in inputoutput labelled transition systems (IOLTSs), and it is typically assumed that it is possible to observe quiescence, a state in which all enabled events are inputs and it is not possible to take an internal transition. Most approaches use the ioco implementation relation; observations are traces that include inputs, outputs, and quiescence, the only type of refusal that can be observed.
For CSP, we define that, in the presence of inputs and outputs, a state is stable if it is not divergent, that is, stable according to the standard stablefailures model, and no output is enabled. These are quiescent states, but in our set up we can observe the inputs that are enabled in a quiescent state: models need not be input enabled. We show that ioco and input-output failures refinement are incomparable: there are processes P and Q such that P conforms to Q under ioco but not under input-output failures refinement, and vice-versa. For input-enabled processes, however, ioco is stronger.
Other lines of work are related to ours in that they investigated refusals for inputs [10, 3, 2] . These, however, allow refusals to be observed in states from which an output is possible. The traditional explanation regarding the observation of a refusal set R is that, if the tester offers only events of R, we observe a refusal if the composition of the tester and the SUT deadlocks. Usually a tester does not block outputs from the SUT and so the composition of the SUT and the tester cannot deadlock if an output is available. As a result, we do not consider a state to be stable if an output is possible (since the SUT can change state) and so do not allow the observation of refusals in such states.
The testing theory of CSP identifies (typically infinite) test sets that are sufficient and necessary to establish (traces or failures) refinement with respect to a given CSP specification. To take advantage of knowledge about inputs and outputs, here we adapt that theory for input-output failures refinement.
In summary, we make the following contributions. First, we define inputoutput failures, and show how they can be calculated. The existing failures model of CSP does not cater for inputs and outputs. We also define input-output failures refinement and prove that it is incomparable with ioco. This relates our results to the extensive body of work on testing based on IOLTS. To obtain a refinement relation that is stronger than ioco, we need to use the refusal-testing model of CSP; we are exploring this issue in our current work. Finally, we adapt the CSP testing theory to input-output failures refinement, and show that some tests in the exhaustive test set for failures refinement become unnecessary.
Next, we present CSP, its stable-failures model and its testing theory, and IOLTS. In Section 3, we present the new CSP model that considers inputs and outputs, and its refinement notion. Section 4 discusses the relationship between input-output failures refinement and ioco. Testing is addressed in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6, where we also discuss related and future work.
Preliminaries
This section presents the notations and concepts that we use in this paper.
CSP and its stable-failures model
In CSP, the set Σ includes all events of interest. In addition, a special event is used to indicate termination, and it is included in the set Σ = Σ ∪ { }. Inputs and outputs are not distinguished in Σ, and none of the CSP models caters for this distinction in controllability. We address this issue in Section 3.
The process STOP represents a deadlock: a process that is not prepared to engage in any synchronisation; its only trace is the empty sequence of events. SKIP , on the other hand, terminates immediately: its traces are and . A prefixing c → P is a process that is ready to engage in a communicationc, and then behave like the process P . A communication may be a simple event on which the process is prepared to synchronise, an input, or an output.
An external choice P Q offers the environment the possibility of choosing P or Q by synchronising on one of the events that they offer initially. For instance, out .1 → SKIP out .2 → STOP offers the choice to synchronise on out .1 (and then terminate) or out .2 (and deadlock). If an event is available from both P and Q , then the choice is internal: made by the process. In general P ⊓ Q is the process that makes itself an internal choice to behave as P or Q .
An input communication is like in?x , for instance, in which a value is read through a channel in and assigned to the variable x . Also, an output out !e communicates the value of the expression e through the channel out . In CSP, however, these are just modelling conventions that use events whose names are composed of a channel name and a value. For example, if the type of the channel in is T , then in?x → STOP is an abbreviation for an iterated external choice v : T • in.v → STOP , where the environment is offered a choice to synchronise on any of the events in.v , where v is a value in T . Additionally, the output out !1 is just an abbreviation for the synchronisation out .1.
Parallelism can be described by the operator P X Q , where P and Q are executed in parallel, synchronising on the events in the set X . For instance, in (in?x → out !x → SKIP ) {|in| } (in!3 → STOP ), the processes synchronise on in.3, then in?x → out !x → SKIP independently offers to synchronise on out .3, and terminates. Since in!3 → STOP deadlocks, the whole process deadlocks. The set {|in| } contains all events in.v , where v is a value of the type of in.
The events on which the parallel processes synchronise are visible to the environment. To make them internal, we have the hiding operator: P \ X is the process that behaves like P , except that occurrences of events in X are hidden. If R is a renaming relation, that associates (old) event names to new names, the process P [[R]] is that obtained by renaming the events in P according to R. If an event e is related to two (or more) events in R, then every occurrence of e in P gives rise to an external choice in P [[R]] based on the new events.
Stable failures This semantic model of CSP characterises a process P by its set traces(P ) of traces and failures(P ) of stable failures. The latter are pairs (s, X ), where s is a trace of P , after which P does not diverge, but may deadlock if only the events in the refusal set X are offered. This model distinguishes external and internal choices (which define the same sets of traces) and can be used to reason about liveness properties (which are related to absence of deadlock).
Failures refinement P ⊑ F Q of a process P by a process Q is defined as traces(Q ) ⊆ traces(P ) ∧ failures(Q ) ⊆ failures(P ). So, the refined process Q can only engage in sequences of synchronisations (traces) that are possible for P , and can only deadlock when P can. Traces refinement P ⊑ T Q requires only traces inclusion. It is not difficult to show that failures refinement can also be characterised as the conjunction of traces refinement and conf , a conformance relation used by the testing community [4] . It is defined as follows.
This is concerned only with traces allowed by both P and Q , but requires that after those, Q can deadlock only if P can.
The healthiness conditions of the stable-failures model [19] provide restrictions on the pairs (T , F ) of sets T of traces and associated set F of failures that are a valid model of a process. They are shown in Figure 1 .
T1 T is non-empty and prefix closed. 
CSP testing theory
A testing theory identifies testability hypotheses, notions of test and test experiment, the verdict of an experiment, and an exhaustive test set. First of all, to reason formally about testing it is necessary to discuss formal models and thus to assume that the SUT behaves like an unknown model described using a given formalism. This is often called the minimum hypothesis [8] . The formalism is usually the language used for specifications. Both in [4] and here, it is assumed that the SUT behaves like an unknown CSP process.
Secondly, nondeterminism in the SUT can cause problems since whether a test leads to a failure being observed or not might depend on how nondeterminism is resolved. The standard testability hypothesis used to overcome this is that there is some known k such that the application of a test T a total of k times is guaranteed to lead to all possible responses of the SUT to T . The implications of this for testing from CSP specifications have been discussed [4] . Again, both in [4] and here, it is assumed that this hypothesis, often called the complete testing assumption, holds. Thus, the SUT passes a test if the application of the test does not lead to verdict of failure, after the test is applied enough times for us to be able to use the complete testing assumption.
An exhaustive test set is a (potentially infinite) set of tests that are necessary and sufficient to establish conformance with respect to a given relation [8] . The CSP testing theory identifies exhaustive test sets for traces refinement and conf .
Given a (specification) process P , for traces refinement, the CSP testing theory considers tests for pairs (s, a) such that s is a trace of P , but s a is not. Given such a pair (s, a) we obtain T T (s, a) defined as follows [4] .
We use verdict events inc, pass, and fail ; the last of these events observed before a deadlock indicates the outcome of the test. If the trace s cannot be followed, we have an inconclusive verdict. If s is executed, then we have a pass, but if after that the forbidden event a occurs, then we have a fail ure. If an unexpected event occurs before the end of s, we have a verdict inc, but if this event is not allowed, then another test finds this. (Testing can be made more efficient by combining tests to form trees but such optimisation steps are not considered here.)
Execution Execution P Q (T ) of a test T for an SUT Q is described by the process (Q αP T )\αP . In words, the processes Q and T are executed in parallel, synchronising on the set of events αP used in the specification, which are hidden. If the events of αP were visible, that is, not hidden, then the environment could potentially interfere with the test execution. By hiding them, we specify that they happen as soon as possible, that is, as soon as available in Q . The verdict events establish the outcome of the test execution. 
Example 2. A very simple traffic light controller that can be terminated at any point using an event end can be specified as follows.
end → SKIP Some of its tests for traces refinement are pass → amber → fail → STOP and
Using T T , we obtain the following exhaustive test for traces refinement [4] .
The process P /s characterises the behaviour of P after engaging in the trace s, and initials(P ) gives the set of events initially available for interaction with P . As defined above, Q conf P requires checking that after a trace of both P and Q , the refusals of Q are refusals of P as well. For that, we check that after a trace of P , Q cannot refuse all events in a minimal acceptance set A of P . An acceptance set A is such that (s, A) is not a failure of P ; it is minimal if it has no acceptance set as a proper subset. Formally, testing for conf is performed by proposing to Q the traces s in traces(P ), and then an external choice over the events a in a minimal acceptance set of P . For a trace s and a (minimal) acceptance set A, the test process T F (s, A) is defined as follows.
As for traces-refinement tests, the last event before a deadlock gives the verdict. The exhaustive test set for conformance to P is shown below; it contains all T F (s, A) formed from traces s ∈ traces(P ), and minimal acceptance sets A [4] .
contains the minimal acceptances after s. As already indicated, for failures refinement, the exhaustive test set is Exhaust T (P ) ∪ Exhaust conf (P ), covering traces refinement and conf .
Input-output labelled transition systems
An input-output labelled transition system (IOLTS) is a labelled transition system in which we distinguish between inputs and outputs. IOLTSs have received much attention in the software testing literature, due to the asymmetry between input and outputs in testing. Formally, IOLTSs can be defined as follows. Definition 1. An input-output labelled transition system is defined by a tuple P = (P, I, O, T , p in ) in which P is a countable set of states, p in ∈ P is the initial state, I is a countable set of inputs, O is a countable set of outputs, and T ⊆ P × (I ∪ O ∪ {τ }) × P, where τ represents an internal action, is the transition relation. The sets I and O are required to be disjoint and τ ∈ I ∪ O. A transition (p, a, p ′ ) means that from p it is possible to move to p ′ with action a ∈ I ∪ O ∪ {τ }. A state p ∈ P is quiescent if all transitions from p are labelled with inputs. We represent quiescence by δ and extend T by adding the transition (p, δ, p) for each quiescent p, calling the resulting relation T δ . Further, P is input enabled if for all p ∈ P and ?i ∈ I there is some
A sequence s = a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ (I ∪ O ∪ {δ}) * of actions is a trace of P if there exists a sequence (p 1 , a 1 , p 2 ), (p 3 , a 2 , p 4 ), . . . , (p n , a n , p n+1 ) of transitions in T δ such that P can move from p in to p 1 through a sequence of internal transitions (those with action τ ) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n it is possible to move from p 2i to p 2i+1 through internal transitions. Given an IOLTS P , we let tr io (P ) denote the set of traces of P . Roughly speaking, an IOLTS action corresponds to a CSP event, except that δ is not a CSP event, and is not an action in IOLTSs.
Failures with inputs and outputs
The traces of a process P are not affected by the controllability of the events. Therefore, the distinction between inputs and outputs does not affect the trace model of CSP. Controllability, however, affects the notion of failures.
We define the input-output stable failures IOfailures (I,O) (P ) of a process in a context where the disjoint sets I and O of events identify the inputs and the outputs. Stability here is characterised by the unavailability of outputs (as well as internal events). A process that is ready to output is not in an stable state because we assume that outputs are under the sole control of the process: they do not require synchronisation, and therefore cannot be refused by the environment. A process that can output can, therefore, choose to output and evolve to a new state before considering any interaction with the environment.
It is our assumption that the SUT need not be input enabled, but we implicitly require the environment to be input enabled, since it cannot block outputs from the SUT. It is clear that many systems are not input enabled since, for example, they provide interfaces where certain fields or buttons may not be available depending on the state. (Such SUT might be regarded as input enabled if we consider inputs at the level of events such as mouse clicks, but this level of abstraction is rarely suitable for modelling.) Such SUT normally does not provide the user with the option to refuse outputs, since it controls the user interface: to block outputs the user has to close down the interface, a process that may send an input to the SUT in any case.
Our definition of IOfailures (I,O) (P ) in term of the set failures(P ) of failures of P is as follows. (This definition is similar to that of a hiding P \ O, but the output events are not removed from the trace.)
For every process P and set O, the pair (traces(P ), IOfailures (I,O) (P )) satisfies all the healthiness conditions of the stable-failures model.
T1 This is about traces(P ), which we have not redefined.
[definition of IOfailures (I,O) (P ) and property of sets]
Example 3. We present the input-output failures of the process E 3 below, in the context indicated in its definition; the events corresponding to communications over the channels inA and inB are inputs, and those over outA and outB are outputs. We have inputs in choice and an input in choice with an output.
For conciseness, we omit below the parameter ({|inA, inB | }, {|outA, outB | }) of IOfailures. Also, if the value x communicated in an event c.x does not matter, we write c?x in failures. For example, ( inA?x , {|inA, inB , outA, outB , | }) represents a set of failures: one for each of the possible values of x in inA.x .
In the above description, we omit the failures that are obviously included due to downward closure of refusals. For instance, the empty trace is paired with all subsets of {|outA, outB , | } in IOfailures(E 3). We observe, however, that there are no failures for traces inB ?x or for traces inB ?x , inA?x and inB ?x , outB .1 , for any values of x . This is because, after each of them, an output is available. So, the states after these traces are not stable.
2
Example 4. For outputs in choice, we have the example below.
There are no failures for , since outputs are immediately available. 2
Input-output failures cannot distinguish between internal and external choice of outputs. In the example above, for instance, the failures would not change if we had an internal choice. This reflects the fact that, in reality, the environment cannot interfere with outputs. As shown by the next example, however, inputoutput failures can distinguish internal and external choice in other situations.
Example 5. We have a nondeterministic choice between an input and an output.
Corresponding to the possibility of the (internal) choice of inp?x → STOP , we have failures for . They indicate that an input cannot be refused in this case.
If we were to use an external choice in E 5, then its initial state would be unstable, as out .1 would be possible, and there would be no failure for . 2
Example 6. Finally, we have a choice involving termination.
Calculating input-output failures As illustrated, not all traces are included in an input-output failure. This is also the case in the standard stable-failures model, where missing traces are those that lead to a divergent state. Here, missing traces lead to a state where either divergence or an output is possible. Using Definition 2, we can calculate characterisations of input-output failures for CSP processes. A summary is provided in Table 1 . To allow us to consider IOfailures (I,O) (P ) as characterising a semantics for CSP processes P with inputs and outputs, we need to define some well formedness rules. First, as already indicated, the sets I and O of inputs and outputs must form a partition of Σ. Table 1 .
Second, we have to restrict the use of the parallel operator P X Q , where the role of events can be mixed. If an event e is an input in both P and Q , then it is an input in the parallelism. If e is an output in both P and Q , then it is an output in the parallelism, and it must not be in X if we are to be able to express the input-output failures of P X Q in terms of those of P and Q .
Example 7.
If the set of outputs is O = {|out | }, the processes out .1 → STOP and out .2 → STOP have no input-output failures for the empty trace. The parallelism (out .1 → STOP ) {|out | } (out .2 → STOP ), however, deadlocks immediately, and so is associated with all sets of events in its set of input-output failures. So, we cannot calculate the input-output failures of the parallelism in terms of those of the parallel processes.
In a well formed parallelism, X does not include events e that are outputs in both processes. If, on the other hand, e is an input in P , and an output in Q , then it is output in P X Q , if it is in the synchronisation set X . Compositional calculation of input-output failures, however, is not possible.
, the events in {|in| } are inputs of in?x → STOP and outputs of in!3 → STOP . The process in!3 → STOP outputs the value of e, which is taken by in?x → STOP in the parallelism, and becomes also available for the environment of E as an output. The input-output failures of in!3 → STOP , however, has no failure for . 2
Finally, if e is an input in P , an output in Q , or vice-versa, and e is not in X , then P X Q is not well formed, since P and Q have conflicting control over e and P X Q does not require them to synchronise. In summary, for processes P and Q , with the same inputs and outputs I and O, well formedness of P X Q requires that X ⊆ I.
Third, for renaming, we require that the controllability of events is not changed: renamed inputs are still inputs, and similarly, renamed outputs are still outputs. In this way, given the sets I and O of inputs and outputs of P
IOfailures
(I,O) (STOP ) = failures(STOP ) and
Proof
The proof for SKIP is similar. 2 For a → P , the characterisation is slightly different. Before a takes place, it cannot be refused, but this is a stable state only if a is not an output. So, we only include failures for if a is not an output.
Lemma 2.
2 For internal and external choices, parallelism, hiding and sequence, input-output failures can be calculated in much the same way as standard failures.
Lemma 3. IOfailures
Lemma 4.
[property of sets and Definition 2]
2 With the well formedness restriction, the input-output failures of a parallelism can be characterised as follows.
Lemma 5.
The failures of hiding and sequence can also be calculated in the usual way.
Lemma 6.

IOfailures
Lemma 7.
[property of sets and Definition 2] 2 For renaming, we require that the controllability of events is not changed. This means that renamed inputs are still inputs, and similarly, renamed outputs are still outputs. In this way, given the sets I and O of inputs and outputs of P [[R]], we characterise its input-output failures in terms of those for P when its input and outputs are the relational images of I and O under R −1 , the inverse of R.
we have that 
This is a straightforward adaptation of the notion of failures refinement.
Chaos is the bottom of this relation (as well as of the standard failuresrefinement relation). This is the process that can nondeterministically choose to deadlock, accept or reject any of the inputs, and produce any of the outputs. Its set of (input-output) failures includes all possible failures. If we consider divergence, the top is also div, the process that diverges immediately. Its set of (input-output) failures is empty, independently of which events are inputs and which are outputs. Recursion is handled in the same way as in the standardfailures model: as the least fixed point with respect to ⊆.
Reduction of nondeterminism and possible deadlocks is a way of achieving input-output failures refinement. For example, we can refine E 5 in Example 5 to either inp?x → STOP or out !1 → STOP . We can also refine E 6 in Example 6 to inp?x → SKIP or inp?x → out !1 → STOP . In general, we have the following.
IOF P Q Proof Inclusion of traces follows from the corresponding laws of CSP, since we do not change the definition of traces. For failures, the proof is as follows.
2 These proofs are similar to those of the corresponding CSP laws.
Input-output failures refinement and ioco
As already mentioned, much of the work on testing is based on labelled-transition systems, and to cater for inputs and outputs, IOLTSs have been widely explored. In this context, the implementation relation ioco [22] is normally adopted. In the context of CSP, on the other hand, the conformance relation is refinement, and in the previous section we introduced input-output failures refinement (⊑ (I,O) IOF ). In this section, we explore the relationship between ioco and ⊑ (I,O)
IOF . First of all, we provide a definition of ioco. We use two functions: given state q and trace s ∈ (Σ ∪ {δ}) * , q after s is the set of states reachable from q using s. Furthermore, we have that out(q) is the set of a ∈ (O ∪ {δ}) * such that, from q, the next observable event could be a. This definition extends to sets of states in the usual way: for a set P ′ of states we have that out(P ′ ) = ∪ q∈P ′ out(q).
Definition 4. If Q is input enabled, we say that Q conforms to P under ioco, written Q ioco P , if out(Q after s) ⊆ out(P after s), for every s ∈ tr io (P ).
As a simplifying assumption ioco requires implementations to be input enabled, which is natural for some domains of application. This avoids, for example, accepting an implementation that can initially either deadlock or behave like P as a valid implementation of P (a feature, for instance, of the CSP traces model). Input-enabled processes cannot have (reachable) termination states. This indicates that ioco does not distinguish termination from deadlock, but that is not all. Conformance under ioco does not guarantee refinement.
Theorem 1 There are Q and P such that Q ioco P , but not P ⊑
Proof We consider P = SKIP and the process Q corresponding to the IOLTS in Figure 2(a) , where in each state with no outgoing transition with label in?x , there is an implicit self-loop transition with label in?x . In CSP, we can describe Q as in?x → (µ X • in?x → X out !1 → RUN ({|in| })), where µ X • P (X ) is the process that behaves like P with occurrences of X used to make recursive calls, and RUN (A) = a : A • a → RUN (A). For ioco, we only consider the outputs that Q can produce after traces of P . The only traces of P are δ * , that is, traces containing zero or more occurrences of δ. For every such trace s, however, we have that out(Q after s) = {δ} and out(P after s) = {δ} and so Q ioco P . To see that Q is not an input-output failures refinement of P it is sufficient to observe that they have different sets of traces.
2 The observation of input-output failures can provide additional observational power, when compared to traces that include quiescence. For example, it is possible to distinguish internal and external choice of inputs. So, it is no surprise that Q ioco P does not imply that P ⊑
On the other hand, under ioco it is possible to observe the failure to produce output (quiescence) before the end of a trace, while under input-output failures refinements we only observe refusal sets at the end of a trace. To see how this can make a difference, consider the IOLTSs P and Q in Figure 2 implicit self-loop transitions that make the processes input enabled. As CSP processes, they have the same sets of traces. They also have the same sets of traces that end in quiescence. Where they differ is in whether they are quiescent after out !1 in out !1, in?x , out !1 or in out !1, in?x , out !2 . To distinguish these processes we need to observe quiescence, or failures, before the end of the trace.
Theorem 2 There are Q and P such that P ⊑
Proof The following processes capture the IOLTSs in Figure 2 (b).
The input-output failures of both IOLTSs in Figure 2 (b) are as shown below, where in?x * denotes a sequence of zero or more occurrences of in?x events, and in?x + , a sequence of one or more in?x events.
Theorem 3 If Q and P are input enabled and Q ioco P , then P ⊑
Proof We start with the first part of the result. Since P and Q are input enabled and for all s ∈ traces(P ) we have that out(Q after s) ⊆ out(P after s), it is straightforward to show by induction that traces(Q ) ⊆ traces(P ). It is also the case that tr io (Q ) ⊆ tr io (P ), a property we use below. We now suppose that (s, X ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (Q ) for some maximal X ; it is sufficient to prove that (s, X ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ). Since Q is input enabled, X = O ∪ { }. We know that s is a trace that can reach a stable state of Q and so δ ∈ out(Q after s). Thus, since tr io (Q ) ⊆ tr io (P ) and Q ioco P , we have that δ ∈ out(P after s). This means that s reaches a quiescent state of P and so it reaches a stable state of P . Thus, (s, X ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ) as required. The proof of the second part is equivalent to that of Theorem 2.
2 These results do not reflect on the value of one or the other conformance relation. In the context of CSP, refinement, rather than ioco is the natural notion of conformance, and input-enabledness is not an adopted assumption, although it is possible to define input-enabled processes in CSP.
Testing
This section explores testing; we adapt the work developed for stable failures refinement [4] described in Section 2. As already said, the notion of a trace is not affected by the distinction between inputs and outputs. We can therefore reuse the previous approach for testing for traces refinement. Additionally, like in [4] , we define the relation conf O that models the requirements, under ⊑ (I,O) IOF , on the input-output failures. As expected, it is similar to conf .
The following shows the relevance of conf O .
2 Since Exhaust T (P ) is exhaustive with respect to traces refinement, it is sufficient to show how an exhaustive test can be produced for conf O . Like for conf , by definition, to check Q conf O P it is sufficient to check the refusal sets in states reached by traces in traces(P ) ∩ traces(Q ). Since Q is not known, we introduce tests to check the refusal sets after traces of P .
We use an approach similar to that of [4] , which is formalised in the definition of T F as presented in Section 2.2. At the end of a trace of P , we give a verdict fail , but propose a choice of events which, if accepted by Q , lead to a pass verdict. In the case of conf O , however, we observe that if a trace leads to a state of P that is unstable because it may produce an output, then a potentially non-conformant implementation might deadlock, produce an unexpected output, or move to another stable state before producing an output. Deadlock is not allowed, and our tests for conf O check that. Unexpected outputs are checked by the tests for traces refinement. Finally, moving to another stable state may or may not be allowed (due to the presence of nondeterminism), and whether the inputs then required are allowed or not is also checked by traces refinement. We, therefore, do not need as many tests for conf O as we needed for conf .
Example 9. Consider the following example in which there is an internal choice between an input and two possible outputs.
Under stable failures the maximal refusal sets after are {out .1, out .2, } and {|inp, | }, and so the minimal acceptances A contains all sets that contain out .1 and one input and all sets that contain out .2 and one input. For each of these, we have one test for conf . On the other hand, in the initial internal choice, only the choice of inp?x corresponds to a stable state and in this state only outputs are refused. In this case, as formalised below, the minimal acceptances is the set of sets that contain only one input. So, we have fewer tests for conf O . 2
Formally, like for Exhaust conf , we consider pairs (s, A) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ). We, however, restrict ourselves to A ⊆ I. This is justified by the following lemma.
Lemma 11. For every P with output events O, set of events Y such that Y ⊆ O, and (s, X ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ), we have (s, X ∪Y ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ).
2 Due to the converse of this lemma, (s, A ∪ Y ) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ) implies (s, A) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (P ). Therefore, since for the construction of tests we are interested in minimal acceptances, it is enough to consider A ⊆ I. We check that such an A is not a refusal set of a stable state of Q reached by s.
We check this by using a test based on s followed by an external choice of the events in A ∪ O. The set O is included to ensure that we get verdict fail only through the observation of a refusal of A in a stable state of Q , in which outputs are not available. If the test deadlocks, then this means that (s, A) is in IOfailures (I,O) (Q ) and so we return verdict fail . If an event from A ∪ O occurs after s then we return verdict pass. In fact, if an output is produced, the state reached by s was not stable, and an inc verdict would also be appropriate, but this distinction is not necessary: what we want to ensure is that a deadlock is not possible. Finally, if s is not followed, then the verdict is inc. This leads to the test T F (s, A ∪ O), using the previously defined function T F .
In conclusion, we obtain the following test set for input-output failures. 
Proof First, we assume that Q conf O P and we prove that Q cannot fail a test from Exhaust O conf (P ). Proof by contradiction: we assume that for A ⊆ I, Q fails T F (s, A ∪ O) ∈ Exhaust O conf (P ) and so (s, A ∪ O) ∈ IOfailures (I,O) (Q ) and , O) , . . .}: these tests check that the SUT cannot deadlock or terminate without first receiving end . In contrast, Exhaust conf (Lights) would also include tests such as T F ( red , {end }) and T F ( red , {amber }), which check that after red the process cannot refuse amber and also cannot refuse end . The following shows how the sets A s (P ) and
[predicate calculus and property of sets]
2 Thus, for every test produced for input-output failures refinement there is a corresponding test produced for stable failures refinement. This shows that Exhaust O conf (P ) contains no more tests than Exhaust conf (P ). As we have seen with E 6 and Lights, Exhaust O conf (P ) can contain fewer tests. To summarise, there are two main differences between the tests produced under stable failures and under input-output failures. First, if s ∈ traces(P ) cannot reach a stable state of P then when testing for input-output failures we have only one test, which checks that s cannot reach a stable state of the SUT. Second, if s ∈ traces(P ) can reach a stable state of P then under input-output failures we only include tests to check for the inputs refused in stable states; under stable failures we also had to check for the refusal of outputs.
Conclusions
This paper has explored a model, a refinement relation, and a testing theory for CSP where we distinguish between inputs and outputs. This distinction is important for testing since the tester (that is, the environment) controls inputs and the SUT controls outputs. It is normal to assume that the environment does not block outputs and, as a result, the composition of a tester and the SUT can only deadlock if the SUT is in a stable state where outputs are not available. We have thus defined a notion of failures, called input-output stable failures, which distinguish between inputs and outputs and only allow refusals to be observed in stable states where no outputs are enabled. We have defined the notion of input-output failures, showed how these can be calculated for (well-formed) CSP processes and defined a corresponding notion of refinement. We have also showed how this relates to ioco and adapted the CSP testing approach of [4] .
Refusals in the presence of inputs have previously been studied in [10, 3, 2] . The key difference between these previous approaches and ours is that they allowed refusals to be observed in states where outputs are enabled. One possible justification for this approach is the symmetry between the SUT and the tester, neither of which need to be input enabled; such a tester can block outputs and so can observe refusals in states where outputs are enabled. What we suggest is that there are systems that are not input enabled but whose environment is input-enabled. It seems likely that there will be classes of system for which we can observe refusals in states in which outputs are enabled, and so we can use implementation relations previously defined for IOLTSs, but also classes of system for which these previous approaches are not suitable.
In occam, a programming language based on CSP [13] , for instance, inputs are distinguished from outputs. (This is, of course, necessarily the case in a programming language.) In that context, there are restrictions on the use of outputs. It is not possible, for instance, to have two outputs offered in an external choice, since in this case, we have a nondeterminism as to the choice of output communication that is going to be carried out. In abstract models, on the other hand, such nondeterminism is not a problem.
There are several lines of future work. Recent work has extended ioco to the case where there are distributed observations, leading to the dioco implementa-tion relation [11] . Like ioco, the dioco implementation relation is only defined for input-enabled implementations. In addition, most of the work in this area has assumed that specifications are also input-enabled and the generalisations to the case where the specification need not be input-enabled are rather complex [11] . Observing refusal of inputs might help simplify treatment of an input not being enabled, but only in quiescent states; this could lead to simpler and more general implementation relations for distributed systems.
We have observed that input-output failures refinement does not imply conformance under ioco because ioco allows partial observation of refusals before the end of a trace. The RT model for CSP allows the observation of a sequence of events and refusal sets, and so it should be possible to adapt it to the case where we distinguish between inputs and outputs as well, and in this case produce a refinement relation strictly stronger than ioco.
The testing theory of Circus [16] , an algebra that combines Z [23] and CSP, is similar to that of CSP. It is based on symbolic tests, and already takes advantage of the conventions of CSP to represent inputs and outputs more compactly. To leverage the results here to that context, though, we need an input-output failures model in the UTP [12] , the semantic framework of Circus.
